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Security bounds for key distribution protocols using coherent and squeezed states and homodyne
measurements are presented. These bounds refer to (i) general attacks and (ii) collective attacks
where Eve interacts individually with the sent states, but delays her measurement until the end of
the reconciliation process. For the case of a lossy line and coherent states, it is first proven that
a secure key distribution is possible up to 1.9 dB of losses. For the second scenario, the security
bounds are the same as for the completely incoherent attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a
Quantum Cryptography, that is quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) followed by one-time pad, allows two honest
parties to interchange private information in a completely
secure way. Quantum states sent through an insecure
channel are used to establish correlations between the
sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob. Since the channel
is not secure, the eavesdropper, Eve, can interact with
the sent states. However, the no-cloning theorem [1] lim-
its her action: she cannot produce and keep a perfect
copy of the intercepted quantum state. After this corre-
lation distribution, Alice and Bob employ reconciliation
techniques in order to distill from their list of classical
symbols, perfectly correlated and completely random bits
about which Eve has no information, that is a secret key.
This key is later consumed for sending private informa-
tion by means of the one-time pad.
The first QKD protocol was introduced by Bennett
and Brassard in 1984 [2] and uses two-dimensional quan-
tum systems, or qubits, as information carriers. Af-
ter it, other QKD protocols were presented [3], using
finite-dimensional systems as well. More recently, it has
been shown that protocols based on continuous variables
quantum systems could offer an alternative to finite-
dimensional schemes. The first of these protocols em-
ployed squeezed states of light and homodyne measure-
ments [4, 5]. Later, a QKD protocol using coherent states
and homodyne measurements was proposed in [6] and ex-
perimentally demonstrated in [7].
The security of continuous variables QKD protocols
against any type of attack has already been proven, both
for the squeezed [5] and coherent [8] case. The bounds
derived in these works provide sufficient conditions for
a secure key distribution. There also exist restricted se-
curity proofs (see for instance [4, 6, 9]) where Eve is
assumed to apply an incoherent attack, that is (i) she in-
teracts with the sent states individually and in the same
way and (ii) performs incoherent measurements before
the reconciliation process has started. The correspond-
ing bounds, then, can be seen as necessary conditions for
a secure key distribution [10]. Unfortunately, there exists
a clear gap between the security conditions for general
and individual attacks, and we are far from establishing
necessary and sufficient conditions for security.
In this work, we analyze the security of QKD proto-
cols employing coherent or squeezed states and homo-
dyne measurements. Using the techniques developed in
Refs. [11, 12, 13], we find new security bounds for these
schemes in the two following scenarios: first, we impose
no assumption on Eve’s attack and derive a simple con-
dition for general security. Later, we assume that Eve
applies to the sent states the optimal individual inter-
action, but, contrary to previous proofs, she delays her
measurement until the end of the reconciliation process.
This type of attacks is sometimes called collective. In this
second scenario, and for the case of a lossy line, we show
that the limits for key distillation coincide with those
found for incoherent attacks. To our knowledge, this is
the first situation in which it is proven that to let Eve
delay her measurement until the end of the reconciliation
process does not modifiy the security region.
By completing this work, we learn that similar results
have independently been obtained by Grosshans [14].
QKD protocols: In all the considered protocols, Al-
ice sends to Bob squeezed or coherent states of light
modulated by a Gaussian probability distribution. These
states propagate through a quantum channel character-
ized by its transmission T and excess noise ε. Bob ran-
domly measures one of two quadratures, X or P , and
communicates the chosen measurement to Alice. Alice
and Bob obtain a list of correlated real numbers from
which the key has to be extracted. There exists an
entanglement-based protocol that is completely equiva-
lent to this prepare and measure (P&M) scheme [15]. In-
deed, Alice’s preparation can be done by measuring half
of a two-mode squeezed state, of squeezing parameter rA,
as shown in Fig. 1. For instance, Alice can measure both
quadratures,XA and PA, after the beam-splitter of trans-
mittivity TA = 1/2. The corresponding P&M scheme
consists of Alice sending coherent states with a Gaussian
probability distributions of variance < X2 >=< P 2 >=
(cosh(r) − 1)/2. On the other hand, if TA = 1 and Al-
ice chooses randomly the measured quadrature, she is
effectively sending squeezed states of squeezing parame-
ter cosh(r) and modulated with a Gaussian distribution
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FIG. 1: The picture shows the considered protocols. After
Alice’s effective preparation using an entangled state, coher-
ent or squeezed states of light are sent to Bob, according to
a Gaussian modulation. Eve replaces the channel by the en-
tangling cloner of parameters rE and TE .
of variance < X2 >= sinh(r)2/(2 cosh(r)). This entan-
glement description simplifies the theoretical analysis of
the protocols, but the obtained security bounds automat-
ically apply to the corresponding P&M scheme.
It is also convenient at this point to introduce Eve’s op-
timal individual attack, the so-called entangling cloner.
As proven in [9, 16], the optimal way in which Eve
can “simulate” the channel (T, ε) is by combining into
a beam-splitter of transmittivity TE = 1 − T , the in-
tercepted state and half of a two-mode squeezed state.
The squeezing parameter, rE , has to be chosen such that
(1− T ) cosh rE = 1− T + εT .
General security proof: Recently, powerful techniques
for the analysis of general security proofs of any QKD
protocol have been presented in [11, 12]. In any QKD
scheme, there is a tomographic process that partly char-
acterizes the insecure channel connecting Alice and Bob.
It allows the honest parties to evaluate their mutual infor-
mation, IAB . Moreover, it puts a bound on Eve’s knowl-
edge: it has been shown in [11] that, using the informa-
tion collected during this process, one can construct a
secure reconciliation protocol that allows to extract
K = IAB − max
ρAB∈R
S(ρAB), (1)
secret bits, where R is the set of quantum states consis-
tent with the measured probabilities (see [11] for more
details). Thus, this quantity represents a lower bound to
the achievable key rate, Kopt ≥ K. For continuous vari-
able systems, if Alice and Bob monitor the channel by
means of the first and second moments of their data, the
state ρAB of maximal entropy in (1) has to be Gaussian
[17]. This is indeed the case for the attack in Fig. 1.
A simple calculation shows that for the same measured
quadrature, the joint probability distribution of Alice and
Bob’s results is Gaussian with covariance matrix
γAB =
(
TA cosh rA +RA
√
TAT sinh rA√
TAT sinh rA T cosh rA +R cosh rE
)
, (2)
where R = 1 − T and the same for RA. This gives the
first term in (1). The second term can be computed from
ρE , since S(ρAB) = S(ρE). Eve’s state is a two-mode
Gaussian state, with covariance matrix γE = γ
′
E1 2,
γ′E =
(
T cosh rE +R cosh rA 0
0 cosh rE
)
. (3)
Using (2) and (3), it is straightforward to compute K as
a function of TA, rA, T, ε.
For the case of a lossy line, ε = 0, one can numerically
see that there exists an optimal squeezing roptA for both
the coherent and squeezed case (see Fig. 2). A possible
reason for this counter-intuitive result may be that K is
known to be a non-tight bound to the optimal key rate
[11]. This optimal squeezing is the same for squeezed and
coherent states, roptA ≈ 1.5, and defines a critical value for
the tolerable losses of approximately 1.7 and 0.83 dB.
As discussed in [11] it is possible to improve the bound
(1) by conditioning the privacy amplification process on
a classical random variableW (see [11] for more details),
decreasing Eve’s entropy. For the case of coherent states,
Alice and Bob can make public the value of the second
measured quadrature, instead of discarding it [14]. This
process does not modify Alice and Bob’s mutual infor-
mation but changes Eve’s entropy. The obtained criti-
cal transmission, Tc, is now a decreasing function of the
squeezing, as expected. One can see that in the limit of
high modulation, rA →∞,
Tc =
e2
e2 + 4
. (4)
That is, the protocol using coherent states and homodyne
measurements is secure up to 1.9 dB of losses.
Collective attack: As said above, the bound (1) is
very useful because it does not make any assumption on
Eve’s attack, but is known not to be tight. Moreover, it
doesn’t allow to distinguish between direct and reverse
reconciliation protocols, where the (one-way) flow of in-
formation goes from Alice to Bob and viceversa. This
distinction doesn’t play any role in QKD protocol using
finite-dimensional quantum systems, but is relevant for
continuous variables protocols [9]. Indeed, for the case
of a lossy line and incoherent attacks, the value of the
channel transmission limiting the security is equal to 1/2
for direct reconciliation, while it goes to zero for reverse
reconciliation, for squeezed and coherent states [9].
In what follows, we will consider an attack where the
only assumption is that Eve applies to the intercepted
states the optimal individual interaction. In the entan-
glement picture, this corresponds to the case where Alice,
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FIG. 2: Tolerable losses as a function of the modulation for
protocols using coherent (solid line) and squeezed (dashed
line) states. The optimal value for both schemes is rA ≈ 1.5.
Bob and Eve share N independent realizations of a quan-
tum state |ΨABE〉. This scenario is again represented
in Fig. 1. However, contrary to the usual incoherent
attacks previously studied, Eve delays her measurement
until the end of the reconciliation protocol. Note that this
attack is clearly coherent, because Eve can globally mea-
sure her N quantum states. Moreover, she can optimize
her measurement according to all the communication in-
terchanged during the whole reconciliation process.
After Alice and Bob’s measurements, the three parties
share N independent realizations of classical-classical-
quantum (ccq) correlated variables A, B and |ψE〉. Un-
der the N independent realizations assumption, it has
been shown in [12, 18] that there exists a key distillation
protocol achieving a rate
K ′ = IAB − χ(A : E), (5)
where χ denotes the Holevo bound [19]. This security
condition is rather intuitive: if this quantity is positive,
the information Bob has on Alice’s symbols is larger than
the classical information accessible to Eve through the
quantum channel Alice-Eve. The results of [12] prove
that this advantage can indeed be exploited for distilling
a key. Moreover they can be seen as the generalization of
the results of [13], where Bob’s information was quantum
(cqq). When considering reverse reconciliation, a similar
expression holds where χ(A : E) is replaced by χ(B : E).
For a lossy line and direct reconciliation, the critical
transmission, Tc, limiting the security is again a decreas-
ing function of the squeezing rA. In the limit of very
high modulation one can see that Tc is the solution to
the equation
Tc(1− Tc)(1− Tc + TA(2Tc − 1))
TA + Tc − 2TATc = (1− Tc)
2. (6)
Remarkably, Tc = 1/2 is the searched solution ∀TA, i.e.
we recover the same value as for the completely incoher-
ent attack [6]. Therefore, by increasing the modulation
rA, the limiting losses value for a key distribution secure
against collective attacks tends to 3 dB.
A stronger result is obtained for reverse reconciliation.
When T and also rA are small, the key rate (5) goes as
K ′ ≈ TAT (cosh rA − 1). (7)
Therefore, there is no loss limit for reverse reconcilia-
tion protocols. But perhaps more surprisingly, there is
no need of high modulation or squeezing for recovering
the same limits as for the completely incoherent attack!
That is, a protocol using coherent states and any mod-
ulation is secure for all line transmissions, even if Eve is
assumed to delay her measurement until the end of the
whole reconciliation process.
Concerning the amount of excess noise the protocols
tolerate, this is shown in Fig. (3). For squeezed states,
it is always more convenient to employ reverse reconcili-
ation techniques. For the case of coherent states, direct
reconciliation turns out to be more resistant against ex-
cess noise up to a channel transmission of ≈ 0.65. Note
that there exist limiting values of the excess noise, εc, for
which the considered key rates are zero, independently of
the modulation and the losses. These values can be com-
puted analytically. For coherent states and direct recon-
ciliation, one has that εc is the solution to the equation
1
1 + ε
(√
1 + ε+ 1√
1 + ε− 1
)√1+ε
= e2, (8)
that gives εc ≈ 0.8, while for reverse reconciliation
εc =
1
2
(√
1 +
16
e2
− 1
)
≈ 0.39. (9)
In the case of squeezed states, the critical noise is equal
to 2/e ≈ 0.7 for both reconciliation protocols.
Concluding remarks: In this work we have applied the
recent security proofs of Refs. [11, 12, 13] to QKD pro-
tocols using coherent and squeezed states and homodyne
measurement. It has to be clear that the obtained re-
sults provide lower bounds to the achievable secret key
rate. Thus, they represent sufficient conditions for key
distillation for the studied scenario (and assumptions).
The first of the analyzed conditions is very powerful
because does not make any assumption on the eaves-
dropping attack. For a lossy line and coherent states,
it has been shown here that a secure key distribution is
possible up to 1.9 dB of losses. Existing proofs of secu-
rity work up to 1.4 [8] and 1.6 dB [5] of losses. Thus,
our results slightly improve the known region of general
security, without requiring any squeezing.
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FIG. 3: Tolerable excess noise as a function of the losses for
reverse and direct reconciliation and squeezed (dashed line)
and coherent (solid line) states. All the curves have been
computed in the limit of very high modulation, rA →∞.
The second type of bounds does not refer to the most
general situation, since Alice, Bob and Eve are assumed
to share N linearly independent copies of a quantum
state |ΨABE〉. Consequently, we have considered the
case where Eve applies the optimal individual interac-
tion [15, 16] to any sent state. Therefore, in this first
step of her attack, Eve is assumed to introduce no correla-
tions among the quantum states shared by Alice and Bob.
The bounds obtained in this scenario cannot be seen as
proofs of general security. However, it is now possible
to distinguish between direct and reverse reconciliation,
a relevant issue for continuous variables quantum cryp-
tography. Remarkably, the obtained bounds turn out to
be the same as for the fully incoherent attack. The case
of reverse reconciliation is perhaps more surprising, since
this is true for any value of Alice’s modulation. As far as
we know, this is the first situation in which it is proven
that allowing Eve to delay her measurement does not give
her any significant advantage (see also [14, 20]).
We would like to conclude with a brief comment on
the N independent copies assumption required for the
bound (5). According to our results, the only possibility
left to Eve that could modify the security bounds for the
fully incoherent attack would be to introduce correlations
among the different copies of the states. Does this fact
provide any improvement on her attack? As discussed in
what follows, one could expect this not to be the case.
After some channel tomography, Alice and Bob know to
share a state ρ
(N)
AB such that any single copy is a state
ρAB ∈ R, consistent with their measured probabilities.
They should assume that Eve has tried to be as corre-
lated as possible to their state. Since the global state
is pure, this means that Eve has optimized the entangle-
ment of |Ψ(N)ABE〉 over the splitting AB−E. Thus, she has
maximized the entropy of entanglement [21] of |Ψ(N)ABE〉,
i.e. the entropy of the local state ρ
(N)
AB , subject to the
constraint that the single-copy state is ρAB. This max-
imization naturally leads to the N independent copies
assumptions, since S(ρ
(N)
AB ) ≤ N S(ρAB) = S(ρ⊗NAB ). Al-
though far from being a proof, this simple argument, as
well as Eq. (1), suggests that the best attack could con-
sist of Eve preparing N copies of the most entropic state.
If this was true, the bounds derived from (5) would hold
and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a se-
cure QKD over a lossy line using coherent (or squeezed)
states and homodyne measurements.
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